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After a system of law passes its formative period, it becomes neces-
sary for it to relinquish many formalities which afford a battleground
for attorneys at the expense of their clients, but which do not aid in
settling disputes on the merits of the issues involved. Notwithstanding
this necessity, there is always an active opposition on the part of some
members of the legal profession against any change, whether it be
advantageous or otherwise. "The fear of dishonoring the law of plead-
ing by making it no art, has led to the retention of many a rule prevent-
ing the determination of causes upon their merits, and serving no useful
purpose other than to give to the law of pleading the appearance of
artistic symmetry."' The ends of justice, however, must prevail over
the artistic requirements of the adjective law. One need but glance
through the history of procedure in Anglo-American law, and the use-
lessness of many formalities will immediately become apparent. For
it is a fact that the legal system is now functioning at least as effectively
without those formalisms which in the recent past were regarded as
the sine qua non of proper litigation, moreover avoiding many disputes
over matters extraneous to the questions at issue. In fact, so great
has been the progress in the simplification of the adjective law,2 that
it is unnecessary to expostulate further on this general topic; one must
rather turn to specific problems. One of these problems requiring
attention is the state of the law concerning alternative and hypothetical
pleadings. Both have been regarded with disfavor by the courts. At
common law both were considered demurrable on the ground of uncer-
tainty, and while the rule has been greatly relaxed .with reference to
the former, it is still practically unchanged with reference to the latter.
ALTERNATIVE PLEADINGS
The objection that alternative pleadings are uncertain, and hence
demurrable, may be answered by the propositions: first, that it is not
at 'all evident that the presence of the disjunctive is a mark of uncer-
tainty, and second, that in many cases the ends of justice can best be
attained by allowing pleadings in the alternative. Certainty in pleading
is necessary in order to apprize the adversary of the issues involved.
that he may be prepared to defend his cause. If that is the reason for
the requirement of certainty, then it must be construed as a requirement
not of absolute certainty (if there is such certainty in general matters
Scott, Fundamentals of Procedure in Actions at Law (1922) 145.
2 "It is gradually coming to be seen that the procedural law does not exist as
an end in itself, but as a means of determining and enforcing with reasonable
speed and at reasonable cost the substantive right of the parties." Ibid. i65-i66.
[365]
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of litigation), but of certainty sufficient for the purposes of thepartic-
ular case. The test whether an alternative pleading is good or bad
should not be some general imaginary uncertainty associated with the
word "or," but whether the adversary is actually able to understand
the pleading and make answer. Thus if an indictment recites a forci-
ble entry into "two closes of meadow, or pasture," the disjunctive does
not in any way work to the prejudice of the defendant, there is nothing
uncertain as to the essential elements of the indictment, and there is
no reason why it should be 'held bad. Yet, the court held it void for
uncertainty. So also it was held that a complaint alleging that the
defendant "scripsit, fecit et publicavit, seu scribi fecit et publicari
causavit," was bad for uncertainty.4 The court in that connection said
that "writing and causing to be wrote are two different acts." That
undoubtedly is true, but it is also true that the difference has no
effect on the issues involved, nor to the liability of the defendant.
Furthermore, the evidence would surely cure the defect, if that is a
defect requiring correction. Again, if the plaintiff charges the defen-
dant with neglect by which a note, on which suit is brought, " was lost
or destroyed," he undoubtedly states a definite cause of action, but in
Stone v. Graves5 the court held the allegation bad on demurrer. In
Commonwealth v. Abell,6 an action for breach of covenant, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant "either converted the slave to his own use
or negligently suffered her to escape," and the court held that the plead-
ing was bad, because "The main object of pleading is to apprize the
adversary of the charge made, or the point of defense relied on; and
to which he is notified to direct his attention." Clearly, in this case
there is nothing uncertain, and the defendant can plead to the two
alternatives just as well as he could have pleaded had they been stated
separately. Another reason assigned by the court for holding the
alternative pleading bad, is that the measure of damages might be
different for the one and the other charge. Whether as a general rule
that is a valid reason for holding some alternative pleadings void is in
itself questionable. At any rate, the rule has no application in the
cases at hand. In Jamison v. King7 the court in discussing the allega-
tion made alternatively said: "Defendants were entitled to a distinct
statement of facts by plaintiff claimed to exist; and it is no answer
to an objection to averments made alternatively, to say that if either
of the averments is true, the plaintiff has alleged a cause of action."
Nor are these decisions entirely a matter of past centuries. In
Macurda v. Lewiston Journal Co.," the plaintiff alleged among other
'Speart's Case (1632, K. B.) 2 Roll. Abr. 81.
4King v. Brereton (1725, K. B.) 8 Mod. 328, 330.
(1843) 8 Mo. 148.
'(1831) 29 Ky. 476, 480.
(1875) 5o Calif. 132, 136.
8 (9o8) io4 Me. 554, 555, 72 At. 490.
ALTERNATIVE AND HYPOTHETICAL PLEADINGS 367
things that the defendant "did compose, print, publish, and circulate,
or caused [the libel] to be composed, printed, published, and circulated."
The court ruled that the pleading was bad on general demurrer. Also
in Cohn v. Graber9 the complaint alleged that the damages were caused
through the carelessness of the defendant in that "he caused or allowed
and permitted the sprinkler system on the premises to become, be and
remain out of repair and in a defective and imperfect condition . .. ."
and the court ruled that since the allegation was in the alternative, it
resulted in no allegation whatever.
It may fairly be said that in none of these cases is there any uncer-
tainty which would have prejudiced the defendant had he answered or
demurred to each of the alternatives as if they were separately stated.
He could as well have defended his case without putting the plaintiff
to the task of amending his pleading. And if the defendant is labor-
ing under the delusion that it helps his case to put the plaintiff to as
much inconvenience as possible, the courts, in the interests of justice,
should not encourage such types of litigation.
But there is still another side to the problem of certainty, which is
often overlooked, and that is the degree of certainty on the part of
the pleader himself. Here again, if we take into account matters of
psychology and environment, we cannot require absolute certainty. In
fact, where there exists a high degree of certainty, the parties in most
cases settle out of court. The courts must recognize the fact that
there is bound to be some uncertainty on the part of the pleader. His
certainty as to each of the alternatives may be affected in numerous
ways and by numerous factors; by his psychological processes, by the
physical environment at the time of the event, by lapse of time, by the
circumstances of the case, and finally by the uncertainty of the law.
Especially do the last two types of factors afford good grounds for
alternative pleadings. The pleader may not be in possession of the
facts because they are not available to him. The facts may be entirely
in the control of his adversary. An allegation in the alternative may
compel the latter to bring to light sufficient facts which would deter-
mine whether he is liable in one way or another, or perhaps both.
Again, we must recognize the fact that, while we claim that the law is a
definite and determined system and that given a group of facts you can
always "find" the rule of law, actually a debate on the part of legal
talent is necessary to formulate the rule, after which it rests with the
court to decide for the plaintiff or the defendant. So far as the parties
themselves are concerned it is presumed, contrary to fact, that they know
the law. The best they can do, however, is to apply for advice to the
lawyers; that is as far as they can go in defending their rights in this
complicated social structure. And if there is an honest doubt on the
part of counsel whether he should proceed on one theory or on another,
(1922, ist Dept.) 2o App. Div. 264, 194 N. Y. Supp. 233.
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he has no choice but to plead in the alternative. To deprive him of
this privilege would mean to punish the client for living in a complex
world, to divest him of the right to litigate his cause with reasonable
certainty, in effect to prevent him from stating the truth, and to cause
him rather to speculate on the judicial machinery. In most of these
cases the pleader is compelled to make his statements in the alternative
rather than state them separately, and from the standpoint of his posi-
tion there is greater certainty in the alternative statement. Certainty
on the part of the pleader is by no means an unimportant element in
pleading, especially if we consider the fact that in many jurisdictions
the allegations must be accompanied by an affidavit. The pleader may
not be able to swear as to the truth of either of the alternatives taken
separately, but he may be able to take an oath on both in the alternative.
Of course he may state the allegation separately on information and
belief, only to encounter still further difficulties in pleading, for in only
a few jurisdictions are such pleadings permissible, and in those in only
a limited class of cases, as for example, where the pleader by the nature
of his position or office cannot have direct knowledge of the facts.
Another possible solution that may be suggested is to make the
pleader state his allegation in separate alternative counts. If the pleader
wishes to allege two distinct causes of action or two distinct pleas in
the alternative, the general rule should apply, i. e. he should state them
in separate counts. just what constitutes a single cause of action has
been the subject of much controversy. The various definitions of the
term, and their historical development have been discussed by Sunder-
land in his article on Joinder of Actions,'0 hence we shall omit the
consideration of the same from our present discussion. Suppose A
alleges that B injured him while negligently operating his automobile,
and wishes to claim both compensatory and punitive damages. If we
take a narrow construction of the term "cause of action," we should
come to the conclusion that there are involved two separate and distinct
causes of action, which should be pleaded in separate counts. The diffi-
culty begins when the pleader wishes to allege the facts of one cause
of action or of one plea in the alternative. At common law and under
the Statute of 4 Anne". the pleader could state his allegations in as
many counts as he saw fit in order to meet the possible results of evi-
dence. The evils resulting from this type of pleading require no
comment in this connection. The rule under most of the codes at
present is that restatements of the same cause of action' or plea in
different counts are not permitted, unless it would be clearly inequitable
to confine the pleader to a single count. Undoubtedly, if pleading
in the alternative is not allowed, and by the nature of the case the
pleader is compelled to make his allegations in the 'alternative, there
is sufficient reason for his pleading the same cause of action or plea
° (i92o) 18 MicH. L. REv. 571.
(17o5) 4 Anne, c. i6, sec. i.
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in two or more different counts. Hence, if we adopt the view that B,
in injuring A, invaded a single primary right and therefore gave rise
to a single cause of action, A should nevertheless be allowed to plead
his cause of action with alternative grounds of relief. And so it was
held in a number of cases.
12
Assuming that the pleader may make his averments in a number of
counts, it still does not follow that he may or should be compelled to
do so.18 To adopt such an arbitrary rule in the case of alternative
pleading would be to presume first, that pleading in the alternative is a
fault, and second, that the alternative pleadings in separate counts will
then meet the objections. That alternative pleading per se is not a
defect has already been demonstrated. The remedy, if there is need
for one, is not satisfactory, for the objections raised against alternative
pleadings on the ground of uncertainty may with equal force be main-
tained against alternative counts. The opponent may claim that he is
still at a disadvantage because he is not informed on which of the alter-
native counts the pleader relies. If the pleader omits the alternative
"or," then he encounters the difficulties already discussed. If any-
thing, this proposition, to compel the pleader to state his allegations in
separate alternative counts, illustrates the fact that the objections to
alternative pleadings as such are imaginary, they are objections to the
word "or" rather than to the pleading itself. If the adversary can
answer to alternative counts, there is no reason why he cannot answer
to the same matter when stated in one paragraph.
Within the past fifty years, however, there has been a gradual ten-
dency toward a more liberal treatment of the alternative pleading. This
has been brought about partly through legislative enactment, partly
through judicial rules and interpretations. Furthermore, a distinction
has arisen between pleading in the alternative as to parties and pleading
in the alternative as to subject matter. It is difficult to see a difference
in principle between these instances of alternative pleading; the dif-
ference is entirely historical. At common law only persons having
unity of interest could be joined as parties plaintiff or defendant. And
so in Oglesby's Sureties v. State'4 the State not having sufficient evi-
dence to determine which of two sets of sureties was liable, could not
maintain action against both in the alternative. And in Casey Pure Milk
'Spotswood v. Morris (1904) io Idaho, 129, 77 Pac. 216; Whittey v. Chic.
& N. W. Ry. (187o) 27 Wis. 327; Chlrosciel v. IV. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. (1916,
2d Dept.) 174 App. Div. 175, 159 N. Y. Supp. 924.
These cases, however, do not throw direct light on the problem at hand, since
it does not appear from the reports that the separate counts were stated in the
alternative.
1 8Payne v. N. Y. C. & W. R. R. (I911) 2oi N. Y. 436, 95 N. E. ig.
(1889) 73 Tex. 658, ii S. W. 873.
(1913) 124 Minn. 117, 144 N. W. 450; 51 L. R. A. (N. s.) 640, note.
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Co. v. Booth Fisheries Co.'5 the Court was of the opinion that without
legislative provision parties may not be joined in the alternative.
After 1873 and before 1896, the rules of the Supreme Court of
Judicature provided that all persons might be joined in one action
as plaintiffs .... "I The courts, however, robbed the provision of its
effect by interpreting it to cover only that class'of cases where a number
of plaintiffs claim relief in one and the same cause of action but not
where there is a joinder of causes of action. 17  On October 26, 1896, the
rule was amended to read as follows:
"All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in whom any
right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or
series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or
in the alternative, where if such persons brought separate actions any
common question of law or fact would arise; .... And judgment may
be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found to be
entitled to relief, for such relief as he or they may be entitled to. .. ."
At first the courts were inclined to interpret the rule strictly, but the
tendency at present is toward a more liberal interpretation. As far as
our present problem is concerned, it is to be noted that in England par-
ties plaintiff may be joined in the alternative. It is also permitted at
present in New Jersey by sections 4 and 5 of the 1912 Practice Act and
in New York by section 209 of the Civil Practice Act of 1920. In both
cases Order XVI, r. 1, of the Supreme Court of Judicature has been
adopted practically verbatim.
Pleading in the alternative as to parties defendant has had a more
extensive and more interesting development. The Judicature Act of
1873 expressly provided :""
"Where in any action .... the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person
from whom he is entitled to redress, he may, in such a manner as may
be prescribed by Rules of Court, or by any special order, join two or
more defendants to the intent that in such action the question as to
which, if any, of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be
determined as between all parties to the action."
Accordingly the rules of the Supreme Court prescribed 9 that
"All persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right to
any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the
alternative ..
But here also, before 1896, the courts interpreted the rule to involve
only cases brought against the defendants on the same cause of action.
2 0
In other words, the rule was not given complete effect for over twenty
"8 Order XVI, r. i.
' Snurthwaite v. Hannay [1894, H. L.] A. C. 494.
36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, Schedule, sec. 13.
Order XVI, rr. 4, 7.
"Sadler v. Great W. Ry. [1896, H. L.] A. C. 450.
ALTERNATIVE AND HYPOTHETICAL PLEADINGS 371
years, and the change came not through any alterations of this rule but
through the amendment of an independent rule, Order XVI, r. 1,
relating to parties plaintiff. Since October 26, 1896, rule 4 has been
fairly uniformly interpreted to apply to all cases where a plaintiff or
plaintiffs claim to be entitled to relief in respect of or arising out of a set
of circumstances involving a common question of law or fact. Thus in
Bullock v. London General Omnibus Co.21 the plaintiff brought action
for personal injuries charging the defendants jointly with negligence.
and alternatively that she had suffered such injuries by the separate
negligence of each of them. The Court of Appeal held that after
verdict and judgment it was too late to raise the question of joinder
as involving jurisdiction when the appellant was not attacking the
judgment but only the award of costs. The court, however, went on
to distinguish the Smurthwaite case and to approve Sanderson v. Blyth
Theatre Co. [1903] 2 K. B. 533, holding that in case of a contract a
joinder such as this was good.
The effect of bringing action against defendants in the alternative is
similar to that of an interpleader in equity. If after the plaintiff has
introduced his evidence it appears that he has not made out a prima
facie case against one or some of the defendants, he is not non-suited as
to that defendant or defendants until all the evidence is in, for each of
the defendants may disclose evidence which would prove the others
liable.
22
In this country the rule as to joining defendants in the alternative has
been adopted in five jurisdictions. Section 115 of the rules under the
Practice Act of Connecticut, which is section 155, Practice Book of
1922 (p. 278), provides that "persons may be joined as defendants
against whom right to relief is alleged to exist in the alternative,
although a right to relief against one may be inconsistent with a right
to relief against the others. '23 The English rule was in substance
adopted in New Jersey,--section 6 of the 1912 Practice Act. Sections
211 and 213 of the Civil Practice Act of New York (1920) reproduced
verbatim Order XVI, rr. 4, 7, of the English Supreme Court Rules.
In Rhode Island the English rule was in substance adopted by statute
in 1876, and in section 20, ch. 283 of the Revision of 19o9. But the
section reads: "Whenever in any action the plaintiff is in doubt as to
the person from whom he is entitled to recover, he may join two or
more defendants with a view of ascertaining which, if either, is liable
." The section says nothing as to joining defendants in the alter-
native. The courts, however, have interpreted the provision to allow
joinder of defendants in the alternative, but in Besharian v. R. I. Co. 2 -
" [i9o7, C. A.] i K. B. 264. See also Re Beck (igiS, C. A.) iiS L. T. R. 629,
and Payne v. British Time Recorder Co. [192i, C. A.] 2 K. B. i.
"Lipman v. Fox & London General Omnibus Co.
'Eames v. Mayo (i919) 93 Conn. 479, io6 At. 825.
U (.918) 41 R. I. 94, 1o2 Atl. 8o7.
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the court interpreted the statute to mean that the plaintiff may so join
the defendants only as to counts alleging common causes of action
against both defendants. In other words, the court adopted the Eng-
lish interpretation prior to October 1896.25 In Wisconsin by section
2603 of the Wis. Sts. 1919, a rule similar to that of Connecticut has
been adopted.
Whether it is necessary for the courts to rely on legislative pro-
visions to permit joinders of defendants in the alternative, as is stated
by the court in Casey Pure Milk Co. v. Booth Fisheries Co.,24
is a debatable question. It is entirely a question of expediency in
procedure, and no constitutional or other rights of the parties are
invaded through such simplified procedure. While it is not an
improper subject for legislation, it may well be maintained that such
reforms need not spring from the Legislature. In Braun & F. Co. v.
Paulson27 the court was of the opinion that "when a .plaintiff is in
doubt about the facts he can establish, he can plead in the alternative.
and objections on the ground of multifariousness do not receive liberal
treatment at the hands of the appellate courts." In this case the court
gave this decision on the ground that the objection against misjoinder
of parties came too late. Obviously, if the ends of justice are best
attained, as the opinion of the court indicates, through action against
the defendants in the alternative, why make that depend on the accident
that the defendants will not make a timely objection as to joinder of
parties? And if the court can permit such joinder in this case, it can
do so in any similar case, notwithstanding any objections on the ground
of misjoinder of parties defendant.
The statutory development of the "problem of alternative plead-
ings as to subject matter has been by far more extensive than
alternative pleading as to parties. Some jurisdictions expressly permit
pleading facts in the alternative. The rules of the Supreme Court of
judicature" now provide that either party may include in his pleadings
two or more inconsistent facts and claim relief thereunder in the alter-
native. And the Code of Civil Practice in Kentucky" provides: "But
a party may allege, alternatively, the existence of one or another fact,
if he state that one of them is true, and that he does not know which
of them is true."
In the main, the statutory provisions have affected alternative plead-
ings of subject matter indirectly rather than directly, and as a result,
(1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 1034; and see (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 328.
'"Supra note I5.
' (i9o6, Tex. Civ. App.) 9"5 S. W. 617, 620.
'Order XIX, r. 24, and Order XX, r. 7. Also as to inconsistent pleas, see
Order XIX, r. 16, and cases cited under that rule in THE ANNUAL PRACTICE,
1923.
" Sec. 113, subsec. 4. And see Conn. Practice Book, 1922, sec. 174, "The plain-
tiff may claim alternative relief, based upon an alternative constrution of his
cause of action."
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the extent of the effect is not uniform throughout the various jurisdic-
tions. As illustration of such legislative provisions the following may
be taken: (a) Some codes provide that pleadings must be liberally con-
strued with a view to substantial justice between the parties.
30
(b) Some codes abolish the demurrer and hence limit the objector to
a motion to strike or to make more definite and certain.
3 ' (c) Some
statutory provisions have the opposite effect. For example, the New
Jersey Practice Act, section i6o, expressly prohibits pleading of subject
matter hypothetically or alternatively!
Whatever else has been accomplished in the relaxation of the rule
against alternative pleading, has come about through judicial decisions.
In some jurisdictions the courts held that where the plaintiff does not
seek recovery on two different causes of action, but merely on two
combinations of facts, he may state them in the alternative. Thus in
Taylor Cotton-seed Oil & Gin Co. v. Puinphrey3" the court said: "The
plaintiffs in framing their cause of action, had the right to state facts
in the alternative so as to meet the phase of the case as may be made
out by the evidence. They were not seeking to recover on two different
causes of action, but were seeking to recover on two combinations of
facts. Either one or the other would establish the liability of the
defendant in the same way." And so where the acts of negligence are
alleged in the alternative, the complaint is held to be not fatally defective,
in Alabama Great Southern Ry. v. Sanders.33  In a personal injury
action against an automobile driver, alleging that the defendant caused
the injuries "either wantonly or through negligently managing the auto-
mobile" the allegation was held to be good in Jackson v. VaughnU
4 but
the court was not consistent in its decision of Kuykendall v. Edmons-
ton 3s in which case the plaintiff brought an action for the wrongful
death of his intestate alleging that the defendant "wantonly, wilfully or
intentionally" killed him with a gun. The court- held the complaint
demurrable, adding that had the word "and" instead of "or" been
used, the complaint would have been good. As a matter of fact, the
logical conclusion is just the reverse: if the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant acted wantonly, wilfully and intentionally, he ought to be
made to prove all three, i. e. wantonness, wilfulness, and intention on
the part of the defendant. Whereas, if he alleges the same in the
alternative, he needs to prove only one of seven possibilities involved
' For example, see Alaska, C. C. P. i9oo, sec. 75; N. Y. C. P. A. 192o, sec.
275; N. J. P. A. 1912, sec. I; Wis. Sts. 1921, sec. 2668; Colo. Comp. Laws, 1922,
C. C. P. sec. 83; Calif. C. C. P. 1872, sec. 452.
.' N. Y. C. P. A. 1920, sec. 277; N. J. P. A. 1912, sec. I59; Ark. Dig. of Sts.
1921, C. C. P. sec. ii89; Pa. Pub. Laws, 915, ch. 483, sec. 3.
(1895, Tex. Civ. App.) 32 S. W. 225.
(19o6) 145 Ala. 449, 4o So. 4o2.
3' (192o) 2o4 Ala. 543, 86 So. 469.
" (1921) 2o5 Ala. 265, 87 So. 882. See also Birmingham Ry. L. & P. Co. v.
McLeod (1913) 9 Ala. App. 637, 64 So. 193.
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in his statement, i. e. wantonness, wilfulness and intention; wanton-
ness, wilfulness but no intention; wantonness, intention but no wilful-
ness; wantonness, but neither wilfulness nor intention; wilfulness
and intention without wantonness; intention, but no wantonness and no
wilfulness; at last wilfulness but no wantonness and no intention. In
other words, if we are going to insist on technicalities, why not make
the technicalities logical? Some courts do realize that for the purposes
of pleading the words "or" and "and" may be regarded as equivalent,
or, at least, that it is not practicable to raise any issue on the use of one
or the other. The New York Code provides for affidavits "on infor-
mation and belief," while the California Code has a similar provision
with the words "on information or belief." The court held that if the
word "and" is employed where the statute requires the word "or" the
affidavit is sufficient. 36 In Globe v. Shute'7 it was held that the com-
plaint alleging that "the injuries and damages sustained . . . . were
occasioned .... by and through the negligence of the City of Globe
in having improperly constructed, caused to be constructed, permitted
to be constructed, or in permitting obstructions to be placed .... ." was
good. The reason assigned by the court being that the inadequacy of
the drain was the gist of the matter, and that the pleader by reference
to the rubbish, and so forth, accumulating in the drain, only meant to
express the same thing or idea although he used the alternative "or"
in expressing the thought. In other words, although the alternative
"or" is used, actually there is no alternative. Such reasoning is typical
in cases where the court is aware that a recognized rule would work
injustice, yet for some inexplicable reason wishes to adhere to it; hence
the facts are named differently and the situation is saved.38
Sometimes the rule is adopted that the party may plead in the alter-
native, but that if he does so, he will be made to adopt and stand by the
weakest of the alternatives. "The pleadings are no stronger than their
weakest alternative," says the court in Union Cemetery Co. v. Jack-
son,39 and in Cohn v. Graber ° the concurring opinion of Justice Green-
baum was based on the proposition that the weaker of the two alterna-
tives did not state a cause of action, and the pleader must be made to
adopt the weakest of his allegations. As a corollary to this rule it is
held in some jurisdictions that each alternative must state a cause of
action, and that if either alternative is bad, the whole pleading is bad.
Thus in Beall v. January4' the court held that "when a party defend-
ant pleads matter in defense in the alternative, each of the alternatives
must, by itself, if true, constitute a defense; otherwise the plea will be
'Patterson v. Frisbie & Ely (1861) E9 Calif. 28.
(1921) 22 Ariz. 28o, 282, 196 Pac. 1O24, 1O25.
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action (igio) 44 Am. L. REV. 12.
(914) i88 Ala. 599, 603, 65 So. 986, 987.
"'Supra note 9.
(1876) 62 Mo. 434, 44o.
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bad." In Curran v. Olnstead42 the allegation was: ".... . that said
bill of sale and transfer by said Percy Olmstead to said First National
Bank was voluntary, and the consideration of $5oo is simulated in
whole, or in a large measure; or, if your orators are mistaken as to
said consideration being simulated, then your orators allege that the
said bill of sale was made .... to First National Bank for the purpose
of hindering, delaying and defrauding his creditors, and the creditors
of said Olmstead & Schewing, and the First National Bank of Anniston
participated with said Percy Olmstead in said intention of hindering,
delaying and defrauding said creditors." The court held that since the
second alternative did not set out facts constituting the fraud, the
whole charge was bad on demurrer. Substantially the same was held
in Mountain v. Whitman,43 but here the alternative plea was saved by
the fact that the respondent's demurrer was also bad, and the court did
not choose to search the record.
In some cases, however, it was held that the party pleading in the
alternative may assert and prosecute both claims in the same cause of
action, leaving it to the court and jury to determine to which claim, if
either, he is entitled, and proof of one constitutes no abandonment of
the other. In Cochran v. Craig" the court was of the opinion that the
law does not compel a plaintiff to select at his peril between alternative
claims. He may assert both, leaving it to the court and jury as afore-
said. This is undoubtedly the more liberal and the more just rule,
assuming that the court's purpose is to settle the dispute between the
parties rather than to award a prize for good pleading.
The general tendency at present is to regard alternative pleadings as
a defect of form only, hence not a ground for general demurrer but
subject to a motion to make more definite and certain. Thus in Par-
sons v. Smith"5 the court held that alternative pleading is a defect in
form only when the facts so stated are material, and may be demurred
to specially; but not so with facts that are not material to the issue.
And in Turner v. First National Bank'of Keokuk46 the court said: "As
to the second ground of demurrer, that it appears from the petition and
amendment, that the relation of bailor and bailee of the bonds existed
between the plaintiff and the bank, and no conversion, except in the
alternative, is alleged, it is only necessary to say, that this manner of
"(1893) 1o1 Ala. 692, 695, 14 So. 398, 399. (italics mine.)
,(1893) 1O3 Ala. 63o, i6 So. 15. See also Birnmingham R. L. & P. Co. v.
McLeod, supra note 35, and Birmingham Ry. L. & P. Co. v. Nicholas (1913)
i8I Ala. 491, 6i So. 361, and cases cited therein.
"(i92i) 88 W. Va. 281, iO6 S. E. 633.
"(igii) 64 Ill. App. 509.
(I86) 26 Iowa, 562, 566; also School Dist. of Sioux City v. Pratt (1864)
17 Iowa, 16; Byers v. Rodabaugh (1864) 17 Iowa, 53; Kinyon v. Palmer (1865)
18 Iowa, 377. The same rule applies in New York and most other code states.
Corbin v. George (1856, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 2 Abb. Pr. 465.
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alternative allegation is not a ground for demurrer." Courts also allow
alternative pleadings where the party pleading has no means of know-
ing which alternative is correct. Thus in St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v.
Langston,47 where the complaint set up a number of negligent acts in
the alternative, the court said: "Where the plaintiff is in doubt about
particular facts as to the cause of the injury, which facts are within the
knowledge of the defendant, it is proper to plead such facts in the
alternative, without rendering the pleading subject to the exception of
inconsistency." And in Bank of Saluda v. Flasters the court said
that an allegation in the alternative, as a general rule, is bad; but it is
sometimes permissible when from the nature of the case the party
pleading cannot fairly be expected to know with certainty which of two
conditions exist, either of Which would sustain his action or defense.
The relaxation of the rule against alternative pleadings has in no
way injured our legal system. On the contrary, it is benefiting our
procedure in that it eliminates many useless battles which consume the
time of the courts, delaying suits and heaping expenses on litigants.
The reform with reference to this problem is not yet complete, for if
we once realize that a disjunction does not necessarily imply uncer-
tainty, then there is no reason for sustaining a greater variety of objec-
tions to alternative than to any other pleadings. In other words, the
mere fact that the pleading is stated in the alternative should not be a
ground for objection. Thus if neither alternative states a cause of
action, the whole pleading may be demurred to. If one of the alter-
natives is so deficient, it may be eliminated by a motion to strike, thus
still leaving a good count on which issue may be joined. If the
pleading is actually indefinite and uncertain, then it should be subject
to a motion to make more definite and certain.
There is perhaps one type of pleading in the alternative which
may be regarded as objectionable on principle, and that is, where the
alternatives are inconsistent with each other. But we mean to
employ the term inconsistency in its logical sense, that is, where on the
face of the pleading it appears that if we assume the truth of one of
the alternatives, we must admit the falsehood of the other. 49 The
question of inconsistency has arisen in connection with alternative
pleadings, but there is a tendency on the part of some courts to attach
a meaning to the term, foreign to all systems of logic promulgated
since the time of Aristotle. For example, in Birmingham Ry. L. & P.
Co. v. Nicholas5" the court seems to say that if one alternative would
' (igio, Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. 334, 335.
' (igio) 87 S. C. 95, 68 S. E. 1O45.
' If A and B are the alternatives, they are said to be inconsistent if A
implies that B is false or B implies that A is false.' In other words, their logical
product, A and B, is non-existent in the given universe of discourse (i. e.
A-B = o). See e. g. Caruso v. Brown (1911) 142 Ky. 76, 133 S. W. 948.
r' Supra note 43.
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amount to one cause of action and the other alternative to another, the
two are inconsistent. Evidently, there is no question of inconsistency
involved. Or if A charges B with ordinary or wilful negligence, he
does not thereby allege two inconsistent facts. The test is: Can these
two types of negligence coexist? Evidently, where there is wilful
negligence there is also mere negligence, although where there is mere
negligence there may or may not be wilful negligence. Since wilful and
ordinary negligence are not mutually exclusive, the assertion of the two
in the alternative does not involve an inconsistency. (If we repre-
sent the two types of negligence by X and Y respectively, then,
mathematically speaking, X-Y +0.) If, however, the truth of one
alternative does imply the falsehood of the other, it is reasonable to
require the pleader to choose his position. Otherwise the pleader, by
asserting the truth of one of the alternatives, denies the truth of the
other and his adversary is put at a disadvantage, for by denying one of
the alternatives he may be compelled to admit the other.
HYPOTHETICAL PLEADING
The hypothetical pleadings, like the alternative, were demurrable at
common law on the ground of indefiniteness and uncertainty. Thus
in Griffiths v. Eyles5L the defendant amended his rejoinder to read as
follows: "That if the said prisoner did at any time or times after the
said commitment, etc. go from and out of the said prison of the Fleet
and from out of the custody of him the said Defendant, he the said pris-
oner so escaped and went at large privately, and without the knowledge,
etc., of him the Defendant, and against his will; and that if any such
escape or escapes was or were so made, the said prisoner after such
escape or escapes, and before the Defendant knew of such escape or
escapes and before the filing of the bill, voluntarily and of his own
accord returned back again into the custody of the Defendant, and con-
tinually from thence forth until and at the time of the commencement of
the suit was, and hath been, and still is, kept and detained, etc." The
court held that the defendant cannot plead hypothetically and sustained
the demurrer. And in Ilfeld v. Ziegler5 2 the plaintiff brought action
for the conversion of sheep and lambs and the answer to the complaint
read as follows: "That if any of the sheep or lambs now and hereto-
fore in the possession of the defendants ever belonged unto Mateo
Lujan and Ambrosia V. Lujan, or either of them; and were intended
to be included in said chattel mortgage, if any such mortgage ever
existed, described in the plaintiff's complaint, the plaintiff, by reason of
his acts in permitting the said Mateo Lujan to transfer, sell, and convey
the property pretended to be included in said mortgage, and by reason
of his failure and neglect to notify the defendants within a reasonable
(1799, C. P.) i Bos. & Pul. 413, 417.
0' (Io7) 40 Colo. 401, 404, 91 Pac. 825, 826.
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time of his rights (if any) . . . . is barred and prevented from having
any claim or demand whatsover against the defendants, or either of
them." The trial court overruled a motion to make more definite and
certain. On appeal the judgment was reversed, the court holding that
such defects in pleading are subject to a general demurrer. And in
Suit v. Woodhal5 3 the defendant pleaded ignorance as to whether the
plaintiff sold him the goods described, and in the second plea the
defendant stated that "If it shall be made to appear that the plaintiffs
ever sold .... to the defendant, it will also appear that .... [the sale
was] in violation of the laws of the Commonwealth." At the trial the
defendant offered to prove that the liquor sued for was sold contrary
to the laws of the state. The court excluded the evidence on the
ground that the answer did not set forth in clear and precise terms the
substantial facts recited.
In some jurisdictions, however, it was held that the objections to such
pleadings are not available on demurrer, but that the remedy is by
motion to strike. In Wiley v. Rouse's Point" the defendant pleaded
that "if the plaintiff fell upon the streets or sidewalks .... and suffered
any injury .... the same was caused solely by the contributory negli-
gence of the plaintiff." The plaintiff demurred, and the demurrer
was overruled, the court holding that since the defendant did not deny
that the plaintiff fell, and so on, it admitted the allegations and pleaded
contributory negligence. And in Emison v. Owhyhee Ditch Company55
the answer alleged: "If any damage was sustained by overflowing said
land, it was occasioned by the plaintiff or the companies designated."
The appellate court held that the motion to strike out the pleadings was
improperly overruled. In one case a hypothetical pleading was held
to be sufficient, but the court intimates that the plaintiff could have
objected by motion requiring the pleadings to be separately stated or
by special demurrer for ambiguity and uncertainty. In that case,
Eppinger v. Kendrick 6 the defendant pleaded first, that he was not
surety on the note in question, and second, if he was surety, then F. had
directed certain payments made by him to be applied on the note, which
had not been done. The defendant introduced evidence to prove the
second defense. The plaintiff objected and the objection was over-
ruled. On appeal the court held that the objection was properly
overruled, adding, however :5 "These defenses should have been sep-
arately pleaded; but no objection was taken by motion to require them to
be separately stated, nor by special demurrer for ambiguity and uncer-
(1875) 116 Mass. 547.
(1895, Sup. Ct) 86 Hun, 495, 497, 33 N. Y. Supp. 773.
(19oo) 37 Or. 577, 62 Pac. 13.
'* (1896) 5 Calif. Unrep. 295, 44 Pac. 234. Compare with Suit v. Woodhall,
supra note 53, where evidence on a hypothetical pleading was excluded.
" (I896) 114 Calif. 620, 624, 46 Pac. 613, 615.
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tainty." In a Wisconsin case, Zeidler v. Johnson,58 the court held that
pleading a statute of limitations hypothetically is allowed under the
code.
Such is the present state of the law. It is not uniform in the various
jurisdictions, nor in some instances in the same jurisdiction. But it is
clear that while the rule of definiteness and certainty is relaxed in the
case of alternative pleadings, Perhaps because it is being realized that
the alternative is not necessarily a mark of uncertainty, the rule is
practically unchanged with reference to hypothetical pleadings.
Logically however, every hypothetical proposition is equivalent to
an alternative or a disjunctive proposition. Before we demonstrate this
equivalence we must first indicate a condition which lies at its basis.
It is the meaning of the ill-fated word "or." Whenever we use this
disjunctive we mean to indicate at least one of a number of possibilities.
Thus, if A charges B with having defrauded him while acting in the
capacity of his agent or attorney, he means to allege that B might have
been his agent but not his attorney, or attorney but not his agent. But
that statement in no manner indicates that he cannot be both agent and
attorney. This is not a matter for dispute but entirely a matter of
definition. People in general use this word like most other words with
a rather loose meaning; sometimes excluding the possibility of the con-
junctive and at other times admitting such possibility. Logically a great
deal can be accomplished by defining the word "or" as not excluding
the possibility of both. Thus, if the plaintiff alleges that he was stand-
ing at or near the track the possibility of his having stood at and near
the track is not excluded. The logical difference between the two uses
of the word "or" may be tabulated as follows:
"OR" excluding BOTH 59  "OR" not excluding BOTH
60
A or B A or B
If A is affirmed, B must be denied. If A is affirmed, B may or may not
hold.
If A is denied, B must be affirmed. If A is denied, B must be affirmed.
If B is affirmed, A must be denied. If B is affirmed, A may or may not
hold.
If B is denied, A must be affirmed. If B is denied, A must be affirmed.
" (1875) 38 Wis. 335.
U Let us take a concrete example: "The defendant either converted the plain-
tiff's slave to his own use or negligently suffered her to escape," and assume
that the statement in the alternative is true. (i) Suppose it is-true that he has
done an act amounting to a conversion, it follows that he did not negligently
suffer her to escape. (2) If it is false that he has converted her, then he must
have negligently suffered her to escape. (3) If it is true that he negligently
suffered her to escape, then he did not convert her to his own use. (4) If it
is false that he negligently suffered her to escape, it follows that he must have
converted her to his own use.
' But if we take the alternative to mean that the possibility of both is not
excluded, then (i) if it is true that he has done an act amounting to a conver-
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In other words, the difference consists in that the affirmation of one
of the possibilities implies nothing concerning the other, if the possibil-
ity of the conjunctive is not excluded. With this condition accepted,
we submit that every hypothetical proposition may be turned into its
alternative equivalent. Let A and B be two propositions with the rela-
tion of implication between them. "If A, then B" is equivalent to the
statement "either A is false or B is true."
6 1 To persons not engaged
in the study of logic this may at first appear absurd; yet it can be proved.
Two statements are said to be equivalent when whatever may be inferred
from the first can also be inferred from the second, and whatever can
be inferred from the second can also be inferred from the first.
That is what we must prove concerning the two propositions, the
hypothetical and the alternative.
It is best to tabulate the proof:
Hypothetical Proposition
2  Alternative Proposition
6 3
If A, then B. Either A i' false or B is true.
i. Assuming that A is true, then i. 'If we deny that A is false, i. e.
B must be true. if we affirm A, then B must be
2. Assuming that A is false, true.
nothing follows about B, i.e. 2. Affirming that A is false,
B may or may not be true. nothing follows concerning B.
3. Assuming that B is true, 3. Assuming that B is true,
nothing follows concerning nothing follows concerning
the truth or falsehood of A. the truth or the falsehood of
4. Assuming that B is false, it the proposition that A is false.
follows that A is false. 4. Denying B, we must affirm
the falsehood of A.
sion, nothing follows as to whether he did or did not suffer her to escape.
(2) If it is false that he has converted the slave to his own use, then he must
have negligently suffered her to escape. (3) If it is true that he negligently
suffered her to escape, nothing follows as to whether he did or did not convert
her to his own use. (4) If it is false that he negligently suffered her to escape,
it follows that he must have converted her to his own use.
i Whitehead and Russell, Principia Mathematica (19o5) iI.
Let us take a concrete example: "If the plaintiff sustained injuries, he did
so through his own negligence," and let us assert the truth of this complex
proposition. (x) Assuming that he did sustain the injuries, it must be inferred
that he was contributorily negligent. (2) Assuming that he did not sustain
any injuries, nothing follows as to his having been contributorily negligent, i. e.
he may have been contributorily negligent all the same. (3) Assuming that he
was contributorily negligent, nothing follows as to the truth of his having sus-
tained injuries. "(4) Assuming that he was not contributorily negligent, it
follows also that he did not sustain injuries, for had he sustained injuries it
would have been on account of his contributory negligence.
'The equivalent of the hypothetical proposition is: "Either he did not sustain
any injuries, or he was contributorily negligent." (i) If we deny that he did
not sustain injuries, ir other words, if we affirm that he did sustain injuries, then
it must be true that he did so through his own contributory negligence. (2) If
we affirm that he did not sustain any injuries, nothing follows as to whether he
was or was not contributorily negligent. (3) Assuming that it is. true that he
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These are all the possibilities that may be inferred from both of these
propositions. It can readily be seen that the inferences are the same
for the hypothetical and the alternative propositions, that whatever fur-
ther inferences which may be drawn from either must be the same, and
that under no circumstances can inferences be drawn from one which
would be contrary or contradictory to those drawn from the other.
Hence all the alternative pleadings we have cited could as well have
been put in the hypothetical form. For example, in Merriweather v
Sayre Min. & Mfg. Co.64 the plea alleged that the deceased was con-
tributorily negligent since he had "knowledge or notice of the defect,"
etc. (held to be demurrable), but it could as well have alleged the same
thing in the from: ...... for, if he had no knowledge of the defect, he
had notice of the same." And in Alabama Iron & Fuel Co. v. Ben-
enante"5 the plea of contributory negligence alleged that the plaintiff
knew that the rock was loose, nevertheless he "worked under or near the
rock." The plea was held to be good, but had the pleader exercised the
indiscretion of pleading exactly the same substance in the hypothetical
for, e. g. ".... if he did not work under the rock, he worked danger-
ously near it," then the plea would have undoubtedly been held bad on
demurrer.
On the other hand, the allegations in the hypothetical form could as
well have been put in the form of alternatives. Thus in Ilfeld v.
Ziegler" the plea could as well have been put in the alternative form,
in which case it would most probably have been held good: "Either the
sheep and lambs did not belong to Mateo and Ambrosia Lujan, etc., or
the plaintiff, by his acts, etc., is barred and prevented from having any
claim or demand." And so in Suit v. Woodhal8 7 the same plea could
have been put in the words: "Either the plaintiff did not sell to the
defendant, or he did so in violation of the laws of the Commonwealth."
In Wiley v. Rouse's Point8 the court missed entirely the force of the
hypothetical by holding that the pleader admitted the allegation and
pleaded contributory negligence. The real meaning of the hypothetical
is: "Either the plaintiff did not fall upon the streets or sidewalks, etc.,
or the injury was caused solely through the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff." Although the court overruled the demurrer to the plea,
yet such misinterpretation might have worked hardship, had the
was contributorily negligent, nothing follows concerning the truth or falsehood
of the statement that he did not sustain any injuries. (4) Denying that he was
contributorily negligent, we must affirm also that he did not sustain any injuries.
(i9o9) 161 Ala. 441, 49 So. 9i6. See also Central of Ga. Ry. v. Freeman
(19oi) 134 Ala. 354, 32 So. 778.
(1914) 11 Ala. App. 644, 66 So. 942. A similar case is Block v. Roden Coal
Co. (1912) 178 Ala. 531, 59 So. 497; also Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v.
Pilgrim (1go5) 14 Ala. App. 346, 3o So. 7o1.




defendant attempted to introduce evidence tending to show that the
plaintiff actually did not fall or did not sustain any injuries. And in
Emison v. Owhyhee Ditch Co.69 the answer was equivalent to: "Either
no damage was sustained, or the same was caused by the plaintiff or
companies designated." Since each of the alternatives states a good
defense, the Court of Appeals might have found that the motion to
strike was properly denied. Surely there must be some misunder-
standing if preference is given to one form of expression and denied to
the other, when the substance of the expressions is identical in both
instances.
No doubt, neither alternative nor hypothetical pleadings are generally
drawn in as clear cut and artistic a style as we should like to have
pleadings drawn (although in some instances that is clearly not so), yet,
if there is nothing in the pleadings which actually obscures the issues,
there is no reason why the adversary should hinder the cause of justice
by insisting on useless technicalities. Furthermore, to punish the party
pleading because his attorney did not plead artistically is altogether
too drastic and unjust, especially since, as a matter of fact, clients
neither have nor by the nature of our system of law can have any
control over the situation.
'Supra note 55.
